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Women, Social Assistance and 
the Supreme Court of Canada 
Les auteures assurent que le rkcent jugement de la Cour 
Suprkme dans le cas de Louise Gosselin renforce et crke des 
entraves dans le systk.me judiciaire qui veut remkdier h h 
discriminatiuon contre les bkneFciaires de la skcuritksociale 
dont plusieurs sont des femmes. L'article examine les cas 
rkcents de Gosselin, Kimberlq, Rogers et Falkiner vs Ontario 
qui dknoncentpubliquement l'intrusion de l'intimitket de la 
dignitkainsi que la volontkde n discipliner et de contraindre 
les bPn@caires, qui sont h la base des assomptions stPrkotypkes 
de la Cour suprkme du Canada. Cet article met en 1umii.re 
li'ncomprkhension de la Cour qui ne reconnaftpas la nature 
des recoupements et des klkments liPs aux dksavantages socio- 
kconomiques de ceux qui sont les moins aptes B se depndre. 
As the labour market continues to shift to a paradigm of 
"non-standard" work, women are disproportionately slot- 
ted into positions of part-time, casual, contract, or shift 
work, with little security, fewer benefits, and minimal 
professional advancement. Given the prospect of low- 
paying and irregular waged work, while continuing to 
shoulder the preponderance of child-rearing and other 
unpaid "domestic" responsibilities, social assistance has 
become a necessary reality in many women's lives.' Per- 
haps contrary to popular (mis)conceptions of free-riding, 
this assistance comes at aprice. For many social assistance 
recipients, it permits heightened surveillance and regula- 
tion over their private activities, both at the state and 
societal levels. For instance, recipients of social assistance 
are often subject to scrutiny regarding spending habits, 
lifestyle, and other normally private choices. Underlying 
this is the pervasive implication that once public funds 
("ourn tax dollars) are used, what is "boughtn becomes 
public property. Or, at the very least, recipients of social 
assistance should feel indebted to the generosity of the 
state. Under this understanding social assistance is nei- 
ther a right nor a remedy, but simply a benevolent gesture 
of goodwill, with poorly defined and arbitrarily enforce- 
able rights against the grantor. 
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These themes are starkly highlighted in a recent judg- 
ment from the Supreme Court of Canada, which consid- 
ered whether certain distinctions made under the Que- 
bec social assistance laws violated the human rights of 
Louise Gosselin. With a narrow five-four majority, it was 
held that Ms. Gosselin's rights under the Canadian Charter 
ofRights and Freedoms were not violated? The majority 
held that the Quebec government's decision to reduce 
the monthly benefits of single social assistance recipients 
under thirty to one-third the normal rate-a mere $170 
per month-was neither an infringement of the security 
of the person nor discriminatory. Ms. Gosselin had framed 
her case as a class action, claiming on behalf of the class 
of social assistance recipients affected by the regulations 
from 1985 to 1989. Due to constraints of space, we 
confine our remarks to reviewing the latter determina- 
tion that Ms. Gosselin's right to equality under section 
15 of the Charter4 was not violated by the Quebec social 
assistance regime.5 The decision (particularly the major- 
ity judgment) lacked a nuanced evaluation of the social 
context of social assistance recipients and recognition of 
the disproportionate impact poverty has on women. 
This disregard led to three primary difficulties with the 
legal analysis: (1) failure to account for the actual expe- 
rience of recipients and the consequent use of stereotypes 
as a substitute for evidence; (2) an impoverished-under- 
standing of the intersectionality of discrimination; and 
(3) the reinforcement of underlying stereotypes about 
the poor. 
Failing to Account for the Social Context of Social 
Assistance Recipients 
Among the many issues discussed by the Supreme 
Court of Canada in Gosselin one of the most contentious 
was the evidence required to support Ms. Gosselin's7 
claims. In considering the evidence, the Court arguably 
misapplied the standard established in previous jurispru- 
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dence. In the absence of what it viewed as appropriate 
evidence, the majority seemed to resort to the use of 
stereotypical generalizations to underpin its legal argu- 
ment. These stereotypes are problematic, not only because 
they went unacknowledged in the judgment and are 
incorrect, but also because they have been effectively 
cemented through the legal mechanism of judicial notice, 
which allows the court to rely on certain widely accepted 
facts without proof. Thus judicial notice, in addition to 
the reliance on legal precedent, allows these stereotypes to 
be reapplied unquestioned 
as presumed facts. Thus 
they will now be difficult Given the prospect to challenge. 
of low-paying a ~ d  
- v -  
irregular waged A Dz@ential Standard 
of Prooffir Social 
work, white Assistance Recipients? 
~0ntinuiMg aa ~hief~us t ice  Mc~achlin 
in her decision for the ma- 
shoulder other ioritv ofthe court held that 
I ,  
u n ~ a i d  "domestic" the claimant had not ad- 
responsibitities, duced sufficient evidence 
to ground her claim. This 
assx"sta@ce has position was made clear 
beeam e a n ecessa ry throughout her decision 
beginning with her refer- 
reality i@ many ence to the lack of "direct 
~ o r n e n " ~  fives. evidence of any other 
young person's experience 
with the government pro- 
grams" provided by Ms. 
Go~selin.~ This was seen again in the majority's concern 
- 
for making inferences about the program's ability to 
respond to the needs of a particular group "absent con- 
crete e~idence."~ McLachlin C.J. expressed further con- 
cern with the mode of evidence adduced by the plaintiff, 
pointingout that Ms. Gosselin "alone provided first-hand 
evidence and testimony as a class member,"'O and that 
there was "no indication that Ms. Gosselin [could] be 
considered representative of the [under thirty] class."" 
These judicial dicta are troubling for the following 
reasons. First, McLachlin C.J. appears to have applied a 
higher standard of evidence to the social assistance recipi- 
ent-claimant in this case than has generally been required 
in section 15 equality challenges. In the highly influential 
earlier case of Law v. Canadz, Iacobucci J., speaking for 
the Court, expressly warned against imposing too heavy a 
burden on claimants and clarified that claimants would 
not be required to adduce social science evidence or other 
data "not generally available, in order to show a violation 
of the claimant's dignity or freedom." Rather, they should 
be allowed, if appropriate, to rely on judicial notice and 
logical reasoning to establish their claims.'2 
- 
Second, although it appears that the majority did not 
explicitly ask for the claimant to adduce data or social 
science evidence, this palliative does not withstand closer 
inspection. The majority complained that Ms. Gosselin 
had not adduced sufficient evidence of the problems 
faced by other members of the class of social assistance 
recipients she claimed to represent and implied that she 
might not be representative of the class. This begs the 
rhetorical question of how many claimants would be 
required to prove that Ms. Gosselin is representative of 
a class.13 We think it unlikely that the testimony of four 
(0.005 per cent of participants), 15 (0.02 per cent) or 
even 100 (0.1 per cent) participants in a program of 
75,000 participants would have been adequate or rigor- 
ous enough to meet this elusive standard of representa- 
tiveness. Ultimately the evidentiary requirements to dem- 
onstrate discrimination against even a minute fraction of 
participants could become an extensive research exercise 
In sock science data collection. This burden of proof 
seemed particularly onerous since Ms. Gosselin's claim 
of the existence of the group "harmed by facts deriving 
from a common origin"14 had already been proved in the 
authorization as a class action; as the authorization was 
not a live issue in the appeal, there was no legal require- 
ment that Ms. Gosselin provide extra proof that she 
represented the class. On the level of principle, a claim- 
ant's decision to organize the claim as a class action 
should not jeopardize her case, particularly since it dis- 
courages the use of collective action to seek a judicial 
remedy for a social problem faced by a group. 
Third, the inadequacy of Ms. Gosselin's evidence, as 
held by the majority, seemed to have affected the finding 
of discrimination in her particular case. Discrimination 
against even one claimant, however, should be sufficient 
to found a Charter violation. As Bastarache J. accurately 
pointed out in his dissent, "it would be a departure from 
past jurisprudence for this Court to refuse to find a 
Canadian Charter breach on the basis that the claimant 
had not proven disadvantage to enough others."I5 Strin- 
gent evidentiary requirements on claimants to show dis- 
crimination, means that they consequently shoulder a 
large part ofthe evidentia~~burden that should procedurally 
(and properly) rest on the government to defend its 
actions. 
The fourth major problem is the barrier this decision 
creates for socio-economically deprived claimants who 
may wish to challenge the allocation of benefits by the 
government. Placing such a high standard of evidence on 
claimants may put these challenges out of reach of such 
parties, both in terms of the investment required to 
generate the data for these cases as well as the difficulty of 
contacting people who live in poverty. Those living in 
poverty are often transient due to insecure accommoda- 
tions and employment, potentially with limited access to 
technology and other  resource^.'^ Further, such individu- 
als may be reluctant to respond to any demands for 
information to avoid jeopardizing the benefits they cur- 
rently receive. 
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Finally, the seemingly heightened burden on this par- 
ticular group of claimants, and in particular on Ms. 
Gosselin as the representative of the group, leads to the 
possible inference that the evidence provided by someone 
in poverty is somehow less worthy ofbeing believed. As we 
will see in the following section, the idea that the credibil- 
ity of those receiving social assistance is somehow im- 
paired, especially in the context of claiming benefits, is 
derived from particular stereotypes of youth living in 
poverty. 
The Use of Stereotypes 
The heightened threshold for evidence presented by 
claimants may lead courts to rely more heavily on assump- 
tions or stereotypes about the classes of claimants before 
them. Although McLachlin C.J. explicitly rejected this 
approach, it was arguably central to the majority's analy- 
sis. First, McLachlin C.J. repeatedly rested arguments in 
her judgment on the stereotype of the enhanced employ- 
ability of younger people. She stated, for example that 
"young adults as a class do not seem especially vulnerable 
or undervalued."17 She continued by stating that to believe 
that young adults may be subject to "negative preconcep- 
tions" would be a "counter-intuitive" proposition,18 add- 
ing that "[ilf anything, people under 30 appear to be 
advantaged over older people in finding employment."" 
These comments were based on a belief that youth are 
more flexible and have more modern skills than older 
people.20 
A second stereotype underpinning the majority judg- 
ment (and workfare programs generally) was that youth 
must be forced through financial desperation to pursue 
work-training opportunities.'' Further stereotyping in 
Gosselin posited that younger people do not respond as 
well as older people to the incentive programs created by 
the g o ~ e r n m e n t . ~ ~  
Not only did the Court base its decisions on stereotypi- 
cal assertions regarding youth employment, it also denied 
that it was engaging in this exercise. Bastarache J. pointed 
out that even though the legislature might have had 
positive intentions in differentiating between the over and 
- 
under thirty groups, doing so was based on the "unverifi- 
able presumption that people under 30 had better chances 
of employment and lower needs."23 McLachlin C.J. re- 
futed this argument in saying that Bastarache J.'s point 
seemed "to place on the legislator the duty to verify all its 
assumptions empirically, even when these assumptions 
are reasonably grounded in everyday experience and com- 
mon sense."'* 
Although not touched on by the Court, many more 
considerations can underpin youth employability.25 The 
problems with the "fact" of youth employability upon 
which the majority relies are both theoretical and empiri- 
cal. Theoretically, youth are not necessarily at an advan- 
tage. Youth are burdened by the assumption that they can 
find jobs easily if they look for them and that they are not 
"family breadwinners" with whom older employers may 
identify. Both these (mis)perceptions may make it easier 
for an employer to terminate a young person's employ- 
ment or decide not to hire her in the first place. Further, 
youth may be thought to be unreliable, transient, rebel- 
lious, and resourceful such that they will find a way to 
survive with less money. By contrast, older claimants may 
be particularly advantaged by the fact that they have more 
job and life experience, greater awareness of available 
training programs and opportunities, longer track records, 
greater knowledge of the system, and larger networks of 
contacts. Also, older claimants may inspire greater com- 
mitment from employers as they share certain contextual 
commonalities. 
These misperceptions about younger claimants, and 
potentially more favourable conditions for older claim- 
ants, are supported by the empirical evidence. The most 
recent Statistics Canada data for 2001 (easily accessible 
and accurate data available through the internet) demon- 
strate that the perception that youth may be more able to 
- - 
find and maintain employment is i n c o r r e ~ t . ~ ~  The group 
facing the highest rates of unemployment is that of 15 to 
19-year-olds (16.6 per cent); the lowest rate is held by 45 
to 54-year-olds (5.4 per cent). Even between groups with 
relatively similar participation rates, younger people fare 
worse than older people: 23 to 34-year-olds have a 6.9 per 
cent unemployment rate 
whereas 45 to 54-year-olds 
have a 5.4 per cent unem- 
ployment rate. These sta- 
Contrary ta popular 
tistics are oaralleled bv the f r n i ~ ) c ~ @ ~ e P f  ions of 
data available for Quebec free-ridling# this 
in the census years 198 1, 
1986, 1991, and 1996, assistarrce comes at 
which show 20 to 24-year- a price. For many 
olds as having unemploy- 
ment rates of 16.3 per cent, 
social assistance 
18.4 per cent, 17.2 per cent r@ci~i@ntsf it permits 
and 17.1 per cent in those heia htened W 
years a n d  25 to %-year- 
olds (with relatively similar surveillance and 
participation rates in the regulation over their 
labour market) as having Private activities, 
unemployment rates of 8.0 
percent, 10.8percent, 10.8 both at .Ithe state and 
per cent and 10.6 per cent.27 societal fevels. 
Unemployment rates for 
younger people in Quebec 
- . .  
have consistently been over five per cent higher than those 
of older people. 
Finally, McLachlin C.J. justified her conclusions by 
noting that "the idea that younger people may have an 
easier time finding employment than older people" was 
not an "arbitrary and demeaning stereotypenz8 and, there- 
fore, was unproblematic. This ignores the majority's own 
warning that paternalistic intentions for a group's "own 
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good" can still be discriminatory when based on pre- 
sumed or stereotypical characteristics of a group.29 The 
idea that younger people, simply because they are young, 
are more capable than those 30 and over of finding 
employment if they only make the effort to do so, is such 
an unsupported a~sumpt ion .~~  This assumption effec- 
tively acts as an unquestioned standard that young peo- 
ple receiving social assistance are required to meet, or, in 
other words, a stereotype incorporated into the analysis 
to justify the finding of no discrimination. Although not 
demeaning in the strict sense, it is still an arbitrary 
There is no reason in principle, therefore, why a 
discrimination claim positing an intersection of 
grounds cannot be understood as analogous to, or as 
a synthesis of, the grounds listed in S. 1 5(1).33 
However, the judicial drive to categorize, and more 
specifically, to work within traditionally recognized cat- 
egories, is apparent in Gosselin, where each of the judges 
unquestioningly accepted that the distinction faced by 
Ms. Gosselin was based on the ground of age. To  be fair, 
this was how the claimant framed her section 1 5 claim. We 
Quite aparl Cram a question of whether a minimum level of 
assistance should be a governmental obligation, discriminatory 
treatment within a social assistance scheme is parlicuriavly 
egregious because its purpose purports tca be highly 
cornptementavy to greater equality goals 
generalization. Despite having recognized earlier in its 
judgment that the market conditions were largely re- 
sponsible for disproportionately high rates of youth un- 
employment, the majority used "everyday experience 
and common sense" to validate the generalization that 
"younger people may have an easier time finding em- 
ployment than older pe~ple."~'  By using the govern- 
ment's non-malicious intent as an analytical tool for 
masking the discriminatory assumptions underlying that 
intent, the majority allows these assumptions to be per- 
petuated, endorsed, and left unquestioned. 
Failure to Account for the Intersectional and Subtle 
Nature of Discrimination 
In the past, the legal analysis of section 15 focused 
largely on slottingclaimants into discretegrounds (such as 
sex, sexual orientation, race, ability, and so on) which 
resulted in claimants whose identities traversed more than 
one of the judicially-defined watertight compartments 
(e.g. a lesbian woman of colour) being forced to distort 
their identities in order to gain legal re~ognition.~' In the 
process, the more nuanced and contextual aspects of the 
discrimination they faced were ignored, marginalized or 
misunderstood. Recently, in the Law case, the Court 
appeared to try to address this rigidity and its conse- 
quences by acknowledging a more holistic approach: 
[I]t is open to a claimant to articulate a discrimina- 
tion claim under more than one of the enumerated 
and analogous grounds. If the court determines that 
recognition of a ground or confluence of grounds as 
analogous would serve to advance the fundamental 
purpose of S. 15(1), the gound or grounds will then 
be so recognized. 
would argue, however, that this is, if not wrong, then 
inaccurate and created four problematic issues for the 
analysis in this case. 
First, a Court is required to account for "the claimant's 
already disadvantaged position ... resulting in 
substantively different treatment . . . " 3 4  in assessing 
whether she has suffered discrimination. In this case, the 
claimant's status as either a person living in poverty, an 
unemployed person, a recipient of social assistance, or all 
three, has placed her in an already disadvantaged posi- 
tion under the regulation. This disadvantage was exacer- 
bated by the lower social assistance rates she received as 
a person under 30. Therefore, a truly contextual and 
purposive analysis cannot exclude consideration of her 
socio-economic status. 
Although the legislative distinction in Gosselin was 
- 
formally one of age, it was the claimant's socio-economic 
status and her dependence on social assistance that made 
this distinction possible. It has been recognized that the 
poor, and especially those on social assistance, are dispro- 
portionately susceptible to state-sanctioned invasions of 
regulation of personal lifestyle,36 and discrimi- 
nation.37 By summarily deciding, as the majority did in 
Gosselin, that the prohibited ground is one of age alone, 
there can only be a fragmented and partial understanding 
ofhow age and socio-economic status interact to discrimi- 
nate against the claimant. The granting and withholding 
of resources for basic human necessities should be the 
distinction at issue. Recognizing this distinction (either 
combined with age or as a primary ground) would allow 
for a more accurate, realistic, and contextual approach to 
a claim of discrimination. The following comment made 
by former Justice La Forest as chair of the Canadian 
Human Rights Act Review Panel, which recommended 
the inclusion of "social condition" as a prohibited ground 
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of discrimination to address the claims of discrimination 
of those living in poverty, is apposite: 
Some barriers related to poverty could be challenged 
on one or more of the existing grounds. However, 
these cases have rarely been successful. They are 
difficult to prove because they do not challenge the 
discrimination directly.. . . [I]f a ~ o l i c y  or practice 
adversely affects all poor people or all people with a 
low level of education, aground-by-groundconsidera- 
tion of the issue can be seen as a piecemealsolution that 
fails to take into account the cumulative effect of the 
problem. [emphasis added]38 
Second, in both the majority and dissent, poverty was 
understood as an externality. None of the justices was 
willing to consider poverty as a possible ground, in itself 
or in combination with another ground, so long as the 
finding that the claimant had been subject to differential 
- 
treatment could be based on an enumerated ground (in 
this case, age). The majority characterized poverty as the 
product of the lack of individual effort to become em- 
ployed. The dissent, written by Bastarache J. situated 
- ~ 
poverty as a precursor of discrimination, to be considered 
merely as a background fa~tor .~ '  In the words ofMcLachlin 
C.J. writing for the majority: 
Given the lack of pre-existing disadvantage experi- 
enced by young adults, Ms. Gosselin attempts to shift 
the focus from age to welfare, arguing that all welfare 
recipients suffer from stereotyping and vulnerability. 
However, this argument does not assist her claim. 
The ground ofdiscrimination upon which she founds 
her claim is age.. . . Re-defining the group as welfare 
recipients aged 18 to 30 does not help us answer that 
question, in particular because the 30-and-over group 
that Ms. Gosselin asks us to use as a basis of compari- 
son also consists entirely of welfare  recipient^.^' 
Although the majority was willing to compare those 
over 30 to those under 30 at the level of generality in 
determining pre-existing disadvantage, it refused to evalu- 
ate differences between social assistance recipients because 
they constituted a disadvantaged group as a whole. This 
"minus one" approach to evaluating discrimination is 
rigid and unrealistic. It only allows single deviations from 
the societal norm: young versus old; affluent versus poor; 
employed versus unemployed. This sort of dichotomous 
thinking can (and should) be avoided ifsubstantive equal- 
ity is to be achieved. 
This leads to a third problem: while the Court fore- 
warned us in an earlier decision not to encourage a "race 
to the bottom" ofcompeting  disadvantage^,^' the decision 
in Gosselin to focus on the single enumerated ground of 
age only highlights the lacuna in the jurisprudence regard- 
ing intersectionality and equality rights-particularly as 
they relate t o  discrimination claims based o n  
socio-economic status. There was evidence before the 
Court in Gosselin of multiple intersecting !grounds: that 
women in poverty were more susceptible to abuse, harass- 
ment, and sexual exploi ta t i~n;~~ that persons with disabili- 
ties, racialized persons, Aboriginal persons, and single 
parents disproportionately live in poverty;43 and, as we 
have seen, that age and geography are also markers of 
poverty for both youth and seniors. Clearly, a claim based 
on numerous characteristics should not delegitimize or 
preclude the claims of those who suffer discrimination on 
fewer grounds or on a single gound. At the same time, an 
additive or compounding approach to the intersectionality 
of discrimination does not further the cause of substantive 
equality but rather devolves it into a formalistic calculus.44 
Unfortunately, all the judgments in Gosselin, for the most 
part, glossed over intersectionality and opted instead for 
the more simplistic, but necessarily incomplete approach 
of focusing on the single enumerated ground of age. 
Underlying Stereotypes 
People living in poverty or of low socio-economic status 
face a host of barriers and discrimination. Earlier we 
argued that differential standards of proof for social assist- 
ance recipient claimants may lead to reliance on stere- 
otypes by the court, which are then entrenched through 
judicial notice and precedent. Here, we will highlight the 
more insidious stereotypes that may have influenced the 
decision in Gosselin and which could erect roadblocks to 
achieving substantive equality in future cases. The follow- 
ing comment of the majority is one example: 
Simply handing over a bigger welfare cheque would 
have done nothing to help welfare recipients under 
30 escape from unemployment and its potentially 
devastating social and psychological consequences 
above and beyond the short-term loss of income. A 
young person who relies on welfare during this 
crucial initial period is denied those formative expe- 
riences which, for those who successfully undertake 
the transition into the productive work force, lay the 
foundation for economic self-sufficiency and au- 
tonomy, not to mention self-esteem. The longer a 
young person stays on welfare, the more difficult it 
becomes to integrate into the work force at a later 
time. In this way, reliance on welfare can contribute 
to a vicious circle of inability to find work, despair, 
and increasingly dismal prospects. [emphasis addedI4' 
This kind of statement fails to recognize that depend- 
ence on social assistance offers neither a liveable existence 
nor a valued status in our society. It ignores that the 
effort involved in simply surviving on only $170 per 
month could be an all-consuming job in itself. Daily 
trials would include finding enough food when access to 
food banks is limited and restricted; finding reasonable 
VOLUME 23, NUMBERS 3,4 
accommodations when rents are high, when landlords 
are unwilling to rent to social assistance recipients, and 
when public housing is scarce; finding employment with- 
out the expected attire and tools for job interviews; and 
maintaining employment, or even accepting promotion, 
when the amount of any extra revenue or cost-saving 
measure is "clawed-back" by social assistance as an offset 
to the deemed amount of needs.46 For women in particu- 
lar, there is also often the added burden of childcare, the 
higher incidence of discrimination in hiring and in pay, 
and the heightened exposure to sexual harassment or ex- 
flected in the majority judgment where evidence mitigat- 
ing a finding of discrimination was cited (as to the 
unemployment rates of youth in Quebec at the time), 
but subsequently disregarded in favour of "common sense" 
assumptions that youth, if they just tried hard enough, 
could become "productive" members of society. There 
was no discussion that the scheme itself may have created 
or perpetuated barriers to employment. For instance, the 
social assistance claw-back, which is still a strong aspect 
of our current social aid schemes, was completely ig- 
nored. Thus, it was open to the majority to freely assume 
ploitation. In this light, a greater that social assistance was simply 
amount of assistance or "a bigger an income supplement: 
welfare cheque" could, in fact, be "\IVelfare re~ipients are 
more conducive to employability seen i u n rem iHi ng l y [There is no] evidence of the 
because it would enable people to actual income of under-30s 
have a small measure of security negative terms by the who did not participate; clearly 
and time to assess their options e~oanovrrieatlv secure, Vivid "aid received is not necessarily 
and opportunitie~.~~ stereotypes [bingo, booze, equivalent to "total income."" 
In addition to failing to account 
for the simple realities of those etc.] ~e\real a rang@ of Even though receiving income 
- - 
living in poverty, the paternalis- irnaaes of Social in excess of the maximum level of V tic undertones of the passage assistance would be contrary to 
above would seem to be based on Assistance Recipients the Reeulation res~ectine social 
" " 
underlying stereotypes ofthe poor f indolent and feeble aid, possibly even criminal,50 and 
and the young as being unem- 
ployed by choice, lack of motiva- to abusers of 
tion, or laziness. Clearly the ma- 
jority did not intend to invoke stereotypes, but its subtle 
assumptions (combined with the lack of proof or discus- 
sion of their veracity) are reflective of the insidious dis- 
crimination faced by the poor in society generally. Jean 
Swanson provides an evocative account of such discrimi- 
nation: 
Somewhat surprisingly, moral explanatory accounts 
of poverty were more common and powerfully per- 
ceived causes of poverty: lack of responsibility, effort 
or family skills were universally cited explanations.. . . 
Most secure participants [in a political focus testing 
study] see children as deserving and their parents as 
less so [possibly unwitting agents of their children's 
misfortune] . . . Welfare recipients are seen in unre- 
mittingly negative terms by the economically se- 
cure. Vivid stereotypes [bingo, booze, etc.] reveal a 
range of images of SARs [Social Assistance Recipi- 
ents] from indolent and feeble to instrumental abus- 
ers of the system. Few seem to reconcile these hostile 
images of SARs as authors of their own misfortune 
with a parallel consensus that endemic structural 
the system. would perpetuate the stereotype 
of "welfare cheats" abusing the 
U 
system, it was the majority's as- 
sumption that it occurred that was the basis for finding 
- 
that no discrimination existed. 
Underlying all of these stereotypes-dishonesty, irre- 
sponsibility, and laziness, for example-is the latent and 
lurking conception of social assistance as charity rather 
than as a societal duty or individual right. So long as social 
assistance is conceived of as, at best, the benevolent 
generosity of the majority, and at worst, stealing from the 
rich to give to the poor, then the human dignity of those 
living in poverty or those receiving social assistance will 
always be impaired. 
The majority used the term "dignity" freely when 
supporting its judgment. The concept of dignity, how- 
ever, is inherently malleable and can be avessel to be filled 
by many different concepts, as has been discovered by 
many common law courts around the The ma- 
jority's conception of dignity in Gosselin is particularly 
challenging. References to the dignity of work and 
long-term self-sufficiency regardless of whether it means 
living with one's parents or being unable to survive 
demonstrate a lack of consideration for the realities of the 
class before them: there is no discussion of the "dignity" of 
- .  
unemployment will be a fixed feature of the new being compelled to perform the workno one else wants for 
economy.48 minimum wage. Certainly, there is little dignity in the 
stereotypical assumption that social assistance recipients 
Such blatant contradictions between group character- will not participate in work or training opportunities 
istics and societal realities are recurring indications that unless forced through financial deprivation. Fundamen- 
stereotypes are at play. As discussed above, this is re- tally, the workfare nature of the Quebec legislation re- 
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moved the choice to work and the right to be free from 
coercion that should be central to human digr~ity.~' 
Quite apart from a question of whether a minimum 
level of assistance should be a governmental obligation, 
discriminatory treatment within a social assistance scheme 
is particularly egregious because its purpose purports to 
be highly complementary to greater equality goals: to 
promote the equal participation in our society of groups 
that may be particularly vulnerable to systemic, attitudinal, 
and other barriers to the realization of their potential or 
goals as individuals; to promote "a society in which all 
are secure in the knowledge that they are recognized at 
law as equal human beings, equally capable, and equally 
deserving. "53 
Conclusions 
As this piece has argued, the recent decision in Gosselin 
reinforces and creates barriers to the use of the justice 
system to remedy discrimination against social assistance 
recipients, many ofwhom are women. The direct impact 
of social assistance regimes on women is evident in the 
recent cases of Kimberly R ~ ~ e r s ~ ~  and Falkiner v. On- 
t a r i ~ . ~ ~  Both very publicly challenge the infringements of 
privacy and dignity, as well as the strong impulses to 
"discipline" and coerce recipients that lies at the root of 
many of the Supreme Court of Canada's stereotypical 
assumptions. Gosselin could have addressed these prob- 
lems head-on, but failed to do so and even created tools to 
justify regressive conclusions. The Court's failure to in- 
corporate the intersecting and textured nature of socio- 
economic disadvantage in its analysis impoverished the 
understanding of equality protected by the Charter. kThe 
erection of evidentiary barriers, the substitution of stere- 
otypes for reasons and facts and the use of stereotypes as 
rhetorical props will only enhance this trend. The bounded 
nature of legal decision-mahng, through backward-look- 
ing doctrines such as precedent and judicial notice, bodes 
- 
poorly for a radical change in future cases. The promise in 
section 15 of substantive equality for all Canadians will 
remain unhlfilled so long as procedural and evidentiary 
obstacles to collective action are erected and so long as the 
- 
law fails to acknowledge and critically examine the com- 
plex nature of socio-economic disadvantage and discrimi- 
nation. 
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